GAO report on electronic voting machines
I know... preaching to the choir... , but if you haven't seen Baxter
the CHIMPANZEE filmed in front of a live press audience hacking a
Diebold machine, it's worth a look! Quicktime Player required. Baxter
was successfully able to delete the audit log, just by pressing
buttons / moving the mouse on the keyboard.
If we don't fix this problem, we have truly lost our Democracy. The
right to vote AND for our votes to be accurately counted is the
cornerstone of any Democracy.
http://www.bbvdocs.org/videos/baxterVPR.mov
Most of you have received info on a report issued by the General
Accounting Office of the US government in September / October 2005,
outlining the inherent insecurity of the electronic voting machines.
The title of the GAO report is...
"Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of
Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to
Be Completed"
If you wish to view the full GAO report (it's long, but worth the
read - don't if you're suffering from severe depression already -
grin grin) is here:
Report# GAO-05-956 ACCNO: A37777 - Full PDF of report is below
http://tinyurl.com/b628m
Summary:
Elections: Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of
Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to
Be Completed (21-SEP-05, GAO-05-956). The Help America Vote Act of
2002 established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to help
improve state and local administration of federal elections and
authorized funding for state and local governments to expand their
use of electronic voting systems. EAC began operations in January
2004. However, reported problems with electronic voting systems have
led to questions about the security and reliability of these systems.
GAO was requested to
(1) determine the significant security and reliability concerns
identified about electronic voting systems,
(2) identify recommended practices relevant to ensuring the security
and reliability of these systems, and
(3) describe actions taken or planned to improve their security and
reliability.
The result in brief from the report is below:
While electronic voting systems hold promise for a more accurate and
efficient election process, numerous entities have raised concerns
about their security and reliability, citing instances of weak
security controls, system design flaws, inadequate system version
control, inadequate security testing, incorrect system configuration,
poor security management, and vague or incomplete voting system
standards, among other issues. For example, studies found
(1) some electronic voting systems did not encrypt cast ballots or
system audit logs, and it was possible to alter both without being
detected;
(2) it was possible to alter the files that define how a ballot looks
and works so that the votes for one candidate could be recorded for a
different candidate; and
(3) vendors installed uncertified versions of voting system software
at the local level. It is important to note that many of the reported
concerns were drawn from specific system makes and models or from a
specific jurisdiction
